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SYMPOSIUM PROCEEDINGS
AUDIENCE MEMBER: I focus back on the quid pro quo aspect of
the analogy to workmen's compensation. It seems the things that
drove us to and started tort reform were products liability and
strict liability. Isn't it a possibility to equate on one side? Isn't
tort reform really giving back to the defendant what was taken
away by strict liability?
PROFESSOR WHITE: I didn't make a laundry list of the various fac-
tors that I thought have affected insurance companies' behavior
in the '70's and '80's. When the insurance (so called crisis)
emerged, one factor surely was the development, the doctrinal
development in products liability. Once strict liability theory was
established, of course the next step is to apply it to an area of
defective products and you begin to define what a defective prod-
uct is. I think on balance it is fair to say two things. First, the
plaintiffs are winning more cases because of strict liability. Sec-
ond, strict liability is growing. I don't, however, think that the
picture is altogether free from alternative developments. Califor-
nia, a pioneer in strict liability, has recently showed signs of read-
ing the key terms of strict liability calculus, such as the meaning of
defects or the meaning of state of the art, in what we may call a
restricted fashion, so that it is not easy automatically to win such
cases. By restricted, I mean they are engaging in balancing very
much like a negligence analysis. They are engaging in costs bene-
fits accounting to determine what they mean by defect or whether
something represents the state of the art. So to me that raises the
basic question that Professor Turkington and others have identi-
fied: which mechanism is going to make the change? If we per-
ceive that the problem is that the tort doctrines are ultraliberal, is
it the courts that are going to cut back on the doctrine or is it the
legislature that is going to come in and make the reform? I think
that the perception that there have been ultraliberal decisions is
clearly there, but of course in my view if the courts intervene, or if
the legislatures intervene, they still won't be able to intervene
past a certain point.
AUDIENCE MEMBER: This question is for the panel in general.
Given the standard concepts of liability against municipalities in
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United States been put in to insolvency because of adverse tort
judgments?
DR. MOONEY: I guess South Tucson, Arizona is basically insol-
vent, but they worked it out. There is one other municipality that
I can't think of.
MR. PARKER: In response to the other side of that, you should
look at those states which have passed restrictive laws in terms of
the liability of a municipality; and we happen to be sitting in one.
The state of Pennsylvania has a $500,000 cap on municipal liabil-
ity for insurance companies which will cover municipalities in the
state of Pennsylvania .... I fail to see the relationship between
the coverage and the cap in those states that have enacted caps.
They are still having trouble getting insurance.
DR. MOONEY: The problem we have with municipalities is the
continuing erosion of sovereign immunity. What happens is a
municipality in almost any accident can be brought in to the ac-
tion. If I'm in an accident and I drive through a red light, the
person could claim that he was injured because I went through
the red light and because the municipality should have warned me
three stops before: red light coming, red light coming, stop light
coming, so on and so forth. So you can frequently involve a mu-
nicipality in an action and that's where we get back to this basic
theme. An insurer has difficulty in assessing premiums for a mu-
nicipality where the source of claims is totally outside the control
and activities of the municipality. That's why we are pulling back,
nothing to do with caps on damages.
PROFESSOR McKAY: You can claim it but you are not going to win
under those facts.
DR. MOONEY: I was explaining why the insurance industry pulled
back from providing insurance to municipalities.
AUDIENCE MEMBER: This is directed to Dr. Mooney, who men-
tioned as an alternative to punitive damages either criminal liabil-
ity or administrative sanctions. I was curious to know what kind
of criminal liability alternatives were you thinking of? What effect
will this have on the standard of proof for the plaintiff?
DR. MOONEY: I was talking about the general liability system.
Let's leave aside punitive damages for the moment. You have two
elements in liability-deterrence and compensation. We could
eliminate deterrence and move to no-fault system. The doctors
are looking at this. When anybody enters the hospital, whenever
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something bad happens to them, an insurance fund could be set
up to provide them with compensation. Then you say, what
about all those doctors that injure people through negligence?
Then we would have laws and regulations either criminal or ad-
ministrative to take away their licenses to deal with that situation.
So in the instance of criminal behavior, in Chicago, where work-
ers died from cyanide and the employers went to jail.
AUDIENCE MEMBER: Are we talking about an individual defendant
as opposed to a corporate defendant, with respect to the criminal
aspect?
DR. MOONEY: The sanctions can be on both individual and corpo-
rate wrongdoers.
AUDIENCE MEMBER: This is directed to Dr. Mooney. You are not
objecting to the money it is the same money. The difference is to
whom the money is to be paid. For example, if there is a punitive
damage award against Union Carbide for five billion dollars; you
wouldn't object to that being paid by Union Carbide into a trust
or something.
DR. MOONEY: We are moving towards a first-party system. That
is, when people are injured, they immediately get compensated
without going to court and waiting five years. This is different
from a system of fault. Then what do you do on the deterrent
side? On the deterrent side you would have the criminal system
or sanctions within the administrative system, such as removal of
license from professionals.
AUDIENCE MEMBER: This is directed to Mr. Parker and Dr.
Mooney. Do your statistics show a significant diminishment of
verdicts for defendants, since the advent of comparative negli-
gence in personal injury cases?
DR. MOONEY: I couldn't say off the top of my head.
AUDIENCE MEMBER: If we are worried about comparative negli-
gence making it a lot easier to win cases, what are the facts? Are
we finding that there are a lot fewer verdicts for the defendants
these days?
DR. MOONEY: No. The economic reason somebody goes to trial
is because there is a 50-50 chance of them winning or losing.
Most of the cases as you know settle out of court. So once the
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win or lose in court, it's still the same. On the plaintiffs' side, the
success they have is a 50-50 chance. On the defendants' side,
they still have a 50-50 chance. When you look at the statistics, for
the state of California you see, it's pretty close to 50-50.
PROFESSOR WHITE: The so-called transaction costs under a com-
parative negligence system would be much higher than under
contributory negligence. You know you'll be "at fault" and
you're not going to negotiate to settle. More often there is a
problem of joining additional people. Once you bring them into
the California procedure, you can bring anybody in, whether or
not they were a party to the action, and apportion the fault.
AUDIENCE MEMBER: This is directed to Professor White. You
identified the moral presence underlying modern strict products
liability as being the difficulty, the proof being what the plaintiff
has encountered in cases like Escola [v. Coca Cola Bottling Co.,
24 Cal. 2d 453, 150 P.2d 436 (1944)]. We learned here that an-
other basis of the utilitarian notion is that industry is uniquely
able to pass on the cost of the tragedies of industrialization to the
consumer. Also, the fairness notion that the tragedies of modern
industrialization should be borne by the system itself. To what
extent is that principle at issue here and perhaps to the whole
panel? Would Dr. Mooney reject that principle?
PROFESSOR WHITE: I'll restrict my comment to saying what Escola
and the follow-up cases represent. I think if we were to look at
them now from the perspective of 1980 economics, they repre-
sent a bundle of mixed arguments some based on cost spreading
and others based on fairness or powerlessness. I think it's also
fair to point out that theories of economic activity have changed
since Escola: the idea of an enterprise being able to shift or
spread its costs indefinitely has been somewhat complicated by
the idea of incentive structures in economics, so that there will be
a point, I heard Dr. Mooney say earlier that under a strict liability
regime there may be a situation where you would have no incen-
tives to make a safe product. I frankly doubt that because of good
will factors. I do think, however, we are in some respects in a
different situation from the time of Escola.
DR. MOONEY: I think this is the basic point we are talking about
here. People will get injured in society, sometimes they are at
fault, sometimes they are not at fault. If they are not at fault and
someone else clearly is at fault then the liability system says that
person should pay. If they are only at fault by themselves we have
1352 [Vol. 32: p. 1349
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the system of first-party medical insurance. What do we do in the
gray area? I think that the argument you're putting forward in
this grey area. The argument goes that since industry is presuma-
bly in some sense knows more about the size of the risks, proba-
bly it has more financial resources, it should bear the costs.
That's arguing for a first-party system and if we argue for a first-
party system, let's go and have a first-party system. Let's just ex-
tend accident insurance and not go through this whole procedure
of staying in court 5, 6 or 7 years with all the expense entailed.
AUDIENCE MEMBER: A few minutes ago with regard to the munici-
pal red light hypothetical, it was said you could claim it, but you
couldn't win, and that reminded me of something Professor
White said, that that you hope that the jury will sort it all out and
see through the crafty lawyers and come to some conclusions.
But even if they do, if someone can come to court claiming that a
municipality is at fault and the jury does see through the crafty
lawyer, you still have a defendant who has incurred considerable
expense getting that resolution and the longer the attorneys are
willing to take on frivolous suits the system pays; whether the in-
surance company is defending it you have to spend money to be
reimbursed. What do we do to avoid that kind of abuse? For ex-
ample, the psychic in Philadelphia who was awarded $1,000,000
for the loss of her powers.
MR. PARKER: Let's talk about the psychic. I don't think that is
abuse of the system. If you know the facts in the case, you have a
woman who made her living as a psychic just like some people
make their living as a law professor or director of public affairs.
Her claim was that she went in to get a CAT Scan. She advised
the doctor that she was allergic [to the dye]. They proceeded
even with that knowledge, one doctor wanted to, the other didn't.
They injected her with the dye. She had a severe reaction and
went into anaphylactic shock. She emerged with headaches and a
great deal of pain and suffering over a long period of time. She
claimed as a result of that she could no longer engage in her pro-
fession as a psychic. The judge at the time of the trial instructed
the jury to disregard any of that evidence and to look at the medi-
cal malpractice claim. They did and came back with an award in
the neighborhood of five or six hundred thousand dollars. There
was prejudgment interest in Pennsylvania, so it amounted close to
$1,000,000. The judge then looked at the result and said no I
think there is something wrong here and he set it aside. I think
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brought shows simply that the system works, and no system is
perfect. I abhor frivolous law suits. I abhor frivolous defenses on
the part of the defense. I think there are more frivolous defenses
than frivolous law suits. It is to the benefit of the defendant to
string the law suit out because that money in terms of the interest
payments is coming in all the time. They are making money on
our money. That's why cases take a long time, that is why so
many suits aren't settled earlier. You could have so many law
suits settled fairly and quickly. I see plaintiff lawyers as collection
plates. That is basically what we are. We have to go collect what
is due to the injured party. If we were getting it we wouldn't have
to go collect it. I also worry about use of the term "frivolous law
suits." I dare say all those law suits brought about by asbestos
were considered frivolous. I think the initial suits on the Dalcon
Shields may well have been considered frivolous. One person's
frivolous law suit turns out to be another person's extreme dam-
age. I think you have to be careful. I think the system easily ad-
justs for that. Yes, there are some costs and those costs are
covered by insurance. Don't forget this is a very incestuous affair
we are having here. The plaintiff lawyer, the defense lawyer and
the insurance company were all in bed together in the civil justice
system. I think we have to arrive at the very best system we can.
As I said earlier, there are some blemishes on it, but it is not the
fault of the people that brought these claims.
AUDIENCE MEMBER: This is directed to professor McKay. Since
our system ofjustice puts so much reliance and confidence in our
judiciary, did the A.B.A. discuss how to upgrade the quality of the
judges in this country?
PROFESSOR McKAY: The A.B.A. worries about it all the time. As
you know there is a very good screening system for the federal
and state judiciary. In my own jurisdiction, the New York Bar As-
sociation worries a great deal about judges and screening panels.
It's imperfect, but I think in general, I hope the others on the
panel agree with me, we're doing better with the judiciary than we
did in former years. The process is more open and there is more
scrutiny of the kind of people and the results. We should never
be satisfied, but I think we're better than we used to be.
AUDIENCE MEMBER: Does there exist a mechanism for continuing
education of judges?
PROFESSOR MCKAY: There is a very substantial network operated
by the FederalJudicial Center. It does a great deal for the federal
1354
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judiciary. I think all the states, certainly New York, has an elabo-
rate system. California has an elaborate system. There is one in
Pennsylvania for continuing education for judges.
AUDIENCE MEMBER: This is directed to Dr. Mooney. You keep
ratings based on experience, but in Virginia, where the Attorney
General also introduced legislation for rates based on state expe-
rience, the insurance industry has been shrill in its opposition.
Can you resolve that?
DR. MOONEY: We're opposed to the legislation in Virginia for a
number of reasons. We would never be opposed to rates based
on experience, where the experience is what we call credible. Let
me give you an idea of what could happen. If you are looking at a
line of insurance, like liquor liability insurance, and you could
look at the loss experience in a low population state like Nevada.
For 1984 the data shows that losses were zero. Premiums were
received but no claims came in. The same result occurred in
1983, no claims. But in 1982 the loss experience was 600 to 1.
For every dollar received in premiums the industry paid out $600.
Clearly, you cannot write liquor liability insurance in the state of
Nevada on its own. You have to spread that around, at least to
California or some states in that region in order to have a credible
statistical base to allocate the risk. That is the issue in Virginia;
on categories like day-care, liquor liability, and other small lines
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